In 2003, David Packard pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OUI).
Nearly twenty years later, in 2022, he filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 30b of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In his motion, Packard argued that his guilty plea should be withdrawn because, in part, he had ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, he claimed that his lawyer failed to advise him that the OUI plea could result in the lose of his commercial driver’s license (CDL).
The trial court denied Packard’s motion and he appealed the ruling.
The Appeals Court sided with the trial judge. In their written decision, the justices hold that Packard’s defense attorney had no obligation to advise his client of all collateral issues that may arise as a result of the plea.
According to the Appeals Court:
But, except for the obligation to advise about potential immigration consequences, there is no general duty to advise a client of all possible collateral consequences flowing from a plea. As a result, even accepting the defendant’s assertion that plea counsel did not advise him that the plea would affect his CDL, he failed to establish that counsel’s performance fell “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinarily fallible lawyer” and “likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense.” (Citations omitted.)
To read the full opinion, click the document below.