Who keeps an engagement ring when the marriage is called off?
Under Massachusetts’ case law, the person who gave the ring (in legal jargon, “the donor”) can get the item back if he was not at fault for the break up.
This rule was established by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in the 1959 case De Cicco v. Barker. The key language of that opinion states
It is generally held that an engagement ring is in the nature of a pledge, given on the implied condition that the marriage shall take place. If the contract to marry is terminated without fault on the part of the donor, the donor may recover the ring. (Emphasis added.)
In De Cicco, the bride-to-be who unilaterally ended the relationship was required to return an engagement ring to her ex (i.e., the donor).
Thus, the question of the donor’s “fault” was never discussed. Nor did the SJC elaborate on how lower courts should analyze a donor’s actions in future engagement-ring disputes.
It took nearly 65 years, but the question of “fault” was resolved by an Appeals Court opinion published yesterday.
The case began five years ago in Plymouth County Superior Court. Bruce Johnson filed a lawsuit against his ex-fiancée Caroline Settino seeking the return of a $70,000 engagement ring.
Unlike the De Cicco case where the would-be bride broke off the engagement, in this case Bruce, the donor of the pricey ring, ended the engagement with Caroline.
According to the Appeals Court’s summary of the facts,
One evening in November 2017…following dinner and drinks, the plaintiff [Bruce] and defendant [Caroline] got into an argument. During the argument, the defendant said, “I’m a good-looking woman. I can get a man whenever I want.” Disturbed by the defendant’s comment, the plaintiff looked through the defendant’s cell phone and came across a text message (text) to a man whose name the plaintiff did not know. The text stated: “My Bruce is going to be in Connecticut for three days. I need some playtime.” The plaintiff interpreted this as an invitation for sex. The plaintiff also listened to a voicemail message from the same individual where the man lamented the fact that the defendant did not see him often enough. Given that the plaintiff’s first marriage had ended due to unfaithfulness, he was very cautious and intolerant of infidelity.
A week or two after this incident, Bruce ended the engagement and, still later, filed his lawsuit against Caroline in an attempt to get back the ring.
After a Superior Court bench trial, the judge ruled that Bruce was at fault and thus not entitled to regain possession of the diamond. The judge’s decision was, in part, based on the fact that Bruce himself ended the engagement. This, according to the trial judge, made him at “fault” pursuant to the De Cicco standard.
Bruce appealed the decision.
The key question on appeal was how the donor’s “fault” should to be assessed in such situations.
Bruce’s argument, as summarized by the Appeals Court, was that
Fault requires some sort of justification analysis; in other words, a party should be found at fault for breaking off an engagement only if the party does so without justification.
The Appeals Court agreed with Bruce and rejected the lower court’s strict-liability approach to fault.
Although fault is variously defined in different legal contexts, no legal standard exists by which a fact finder can adjudge culpability or fault in a prenuptial breakup. Whatever the definition, in our view, it cannot be that the person at fault for a relationship break-up is simply the one who decides to end it; common sense dictates that a party who ends an engagement is not necessarily the one to blame for that result. Were it otherwise, fault in the engagement termination context would be more akin to strict liability. We thus agree with the plaintiff…that a justification analysis is needed to assess fault in these circumstances. (Emphasis added. Citations and Quotations omitted.)
Accordingly, the Appeals Court held that Bruce was not at fault for ending relations with Caroline. He is, therefore, entitled to have the ring returned to him.
To read the opinion, in its entirety, click the document below.