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State Police stopped Richard Mwaniki around midnight on May 3, 2019. According to the government’s version of the facts, Richard’s car nearly struck a guardrail as he drove north on Route 24 in Raynham.

A trooper who observed the incident stopped Richard and, after a brief conversation, noticed the classic indicia of intoxication (e.g., slurred speech, glassy/bloodshot eyes, order of alcohol).

Richard failed the field sobriety test and supposedly almost fell when being walked to the police cruiser.

At trial the trooper was asked to describe the defendant’s condition during their encounter. He testified that the defendant was “bombed.”

The defendant’s lawyer made no objection to the testimony.

Ultimately, the jury convicted Richard and he appealed the verdict.

On appeal, Richard argued that the trial judge erred by allowing the trooper’s testimony describing him as “bombed.”

The Appeals Court rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.

First, citing applicable case law, the justices wrote,

[L]ay witnesses, including police officers, may not opine as to the ultimate question whether the defendant was operating while under the influence, but they may testify to his apparent intoxication. Provided that a witness does not directly offer an opinion regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case, we have no rule in Massachusetts prohibiting an opinion that touches on an ultimate issue. (Emphasis added. Citations and quotations omitted.)

Applying that law to the present case, the court held that

the trooper testified to the defendant’s apparent intoxication, but did not opine as to the ultimate question of whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The trooper’s use of the colloquial term “bombed” to describe the defendant’s intoxication merely represents a lay opinion regarding the level of the defendant’s insobriety. Where the trooper testified to the specific bases for his opinion, we discern no risk that the jury inferred any extraevidentiary foundation for it.

The full text of the opinion is attached below.