In October 2018, Jean Olson of Brockton had her conservator sign her last will and testament.
Although Plymouth County’s probate court appointed the conservator to manage Ms. Olson’s legal and financial matters, he had no authority to execute her will.
Additionally, the conservator signed his own name to the will rather than Ms. Olson’s.
Under Massachusetts law (M.G.L. c. 190B, Section 2-502), the will should have been signed by Olson herself or by a third party in Olson’s name and in her presence.
After Ms. Olson’s death in May 2019, the conservator filed a petition in probate court seeking to administer the estate.
The decedent’s nephews challenged the will, arguing that it was executed improperly and thus invalid.
A probate court judge agreed with the nephews and the conservator’s petition was rejected.
The conservator appealed the matter. In his appeal, he argued that M.G.L. c. 190B, Section 2-502(b) permitted the use of “extrinsic evidence” to establish the testator’s intent. The pertinent section of the statute states,
Intent that the document constitute the testator’s will can be established by extrinsic evidence.
Although the justices acknowledged that the will was signed improperly, they agreed with the conservator’s claim that Section 2-502(b) allowed Ms. Olson’s intend and the validity of the will to be proved with “extrinsic evidence”:
We conclude that in the specific circumstances of this case– where a separate statute (the conservatorship statute) allows conservators with court authorization to execute wills on behalf of other persons, and the conservator here acted on the belief that he had such authorization — the language creating the exception to § 2-502 (a) is best construed to permit the use of extrinsic evidence to establish that the unsigned document is a valid will. A contrary reading would risk allowing a good faith mistake of the conservator, a person specifically appointed by the court to manage Olson’s estate, to override Olson’s testamentary intent. As we do not believe this would be consistent with the statutory purposes, we vacate the dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings.
To read the full text of the opinion, click the document below.