In January 2021 Boston police stopped Lyriq Rivera for an expired registration sticker. When asked for his license, Rivera gave police his learner’s permit. Because Rivera was not accompanied by a licensed driver, he was placed under arrest.
Police told Rivera to step out of the car. They then frisked him for weapons. The first officer to patted down Rivera noticed a hard, round object larger than a golf ball inside his underwear. The officer knew the object was not a weapon, but suspected that it was drugs.
The officer moved Rivera to the sidewalk, pulled back Rivera’s waistband, and put his hand down Rivera’s underwear for about ten seconds. The officer recovered what he believed to be narcotics. (Rivera was charged with trafficing fentanyl and cocaine.)
The search took place in broad daylight as traffic drove past on the road and at least two pedestrians walked past on the sidewalk. Both a daycare and residential buildings were on the side of the street facing Rivera.
Rivera’s lawyer in superior court filed a motion to suppress the alleged drugs due to the illegality of the search. The judge denied the motion citing the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Amado. This is highly unusual because even a first-year law student knows that a dissenting opinion is not controlling case law.
Rivera’s lawyer appealed the ruling.
The Appeals Court reversed the judge’s decision.
First, the justices noted the legal requirements for officers to conduct a strip search
A strip search is unreasonable where, absent exigent circumstances, it is conducted in public.
Here the search did indeed occur in public and there were no “exigent circumstances” that justified the police’s conduct.
The justices also noted that the judge erred by applying a dissenting SJC opinion when making his ruling:
After describing the opinion of the majority and the dissent in Amado, the motion judge opted to follow the dissent: “Like the dissent opinion in Amado, I find that the strip search [of the defendant] was reasonable in scope and manner.” Neither we nor the trial court judges have the “power to alter, overrule or decline to follow the holding of . . . the Supreme Judicial Court.
The full text of the opinion is attached below.