Sit through any criminal session in district court and you’re likely to see at least one harassment prevention order (HPO) hearing.
These hearings can be agonizing, especially when it’s two neighbors going at it.
According to court documents, Jane Sullivan petitioned Gloucester District Court for an HPO against her condominium neighbor, Michail Sitkovsky, in 2023.
The HPO hearings dragged on for three days before a district court judge denied Sullivan’s petition.
Following the HPO denial, Sitkovsky (who claims to have spent over $17,000 in attorney’s fees) went on the legal offensive.
He filed a civil lawsuit against Sullivan for alleged abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
Sullivan’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit citing the state’s anti-SLAPP statute (G.L. c. 231, Sec. 59H). That statute, in part, states,
In any case…in which a party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are based on said party’s exercise of its right of petition under the constitution of the United States or of the commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to dismiss.
Such a motion must be allowed unless
the party against whom such special motion is made shows that: (1) the moving party’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party.
The trial judge denied Sullivan’s motion to dismiss, writing
this Court [concludes] that Sitkovsky has satisfied the first part of his stage-two burden by showing that Sullivan’s petitioning activity was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. Furthermore, Sitkovsky has shown that Sullivan’s petitioning activity caused him “actual injury” in the form of attorney’s fees and costs, thereby satisfying the second part of his stage-two burden.
Undeterred, Sullivan appealed the denial.
Today the Appeals Court published a slip opinion upholding the trial judge’s ruling. The justices concluded
that Sitkovsky satisfied his burden to show that Sullivan’s petitioning activity lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. Sitkovsky also met the second requirement necessary to defeat Sullivan’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. He stated in an uncontradicted affidavit that he “incurred $17,870.00 in attorneys’ fees” as a result of the harassment prevention case. This was sufficient to show that Sullivan caused “actual injury” to Sitkovsky.
The full text of the opinion is attached below.