Here’s a case that brings back bad memories of my law school property class.
Maureen’s Mirtilli, LLC (“Mirtilli”) owns and operates a cranberry bog in Sandwich, Massachusetts.
The cranberry bog is comprised of three contiguous parcels that are essentially landlocked.
The land’s previous owners accessed the property by crossing a neighboring lot.
That lot is owned by Idlewild Acres, LLC (“Idlewild”).
In 2018 Idelwild blocked the path leading to the cranberry bog–an action that quickly triggered a land dispute in superior court.
The case was then moved from superior court to land court.
Mirtilli argued that an easement existed over Idelwild’s land for two combined reasons.
First, the easement is shown on a 1930 plan of the property recorded in land court.
Second, Mirtilli cites to language in Idlewild’s deed that reads
So much of said land as is included within limits of the ways [on the plan]…is subject to the rights of all persons lawfully entitled thereto in and over the same.
This language, Mirtilli contends, subjects Idlewild’s land to the easements shown on the 1930 plan.
Idlewild filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing Mirtilli’ lawsuit.
A land court judge allowed the motion and Mirtilli’s appealed.
The Appeals Court upheld the summary judgment.
According to the justices, both of Mirtilli’s arguments miss the mark.
First, “the plan itself would prove to be a dead end because the Mirtilli lots are not within the plan.”
(I don’t see how this negates the existence an easement that is clearly on the plan. But I’m not an appellate judge. So who cares what I think?)
Next, the justices were not persuaded that language in Idlewild’s deed subjected his land to an easement on the land court plan. Why? Because the deed’s language is too vague to create an easement in these circumstances.
Vague language will not suffice to fulfil the requirements…for a recorded easement on the certificate of title…The language here suffers from a lack of “particularity” that identifies Mirtilli’s land as benefiting from such an easement.
But what about the fact that prior owners crossed Idlewild’s land to access the bog?
Mere evidence that Idlewild knew the ways had been used by Mirtilli or its predecessors is insufficient because such use may constitute mere “permissive use” rather than an easement.
The full text of the slip opinion is attached below.