Here in Massachusetts you can be charged and convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor (G.L. c. 266, 16A) without the prosecutor specifying the intended crime.
That’s the takeaway from a slip opinion published today by the Supreme Judicial Court.
The defendant allegedly entered her old apartment (using a key) and retrieved some personal belongings.
The property owner was present when this happened and she ordered the defendant to leave.
As the defendant got into her car, the property owner’s dog (a Shih Tzu) jumped into the vehicle.
The property owner claims that she reached into the defendant’s car to grab the dog.
The defendant allegedly shut the window on the woman’s fingers before driving away.
The defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.
She elected to have a bench trial.
During the trial, the prosecutor presented no evidence regarding what crime was intended when the defendant supposedly broke and entered the alleged victim’s dwelling.
Nevertheless, the judge convicted the defendant.
Understandably, the defendant appealed the decision, arguing that the government must specify what misdemeanor the defendant intended at the time of the alleged breaking and entering.
Seems reasonable, right?
Not to the SJC.
The justices affirmed the trial judge’s decision.
In their slip opinion, the justices write,
In the lexicon of Massachusetts crimes there is no such crime as ‘breaking and entering’ unaccompanied by intent to commit a felony or a misdemeanor The Commonwealth is not, however, required to identify the misdemeanor the defendant intends to commit upon entry. As we have said, the Commonwealth need not specify the intended misdemeanor because the particular misdemeanor is not an element of the crime charged, and thus, the fact finder can properly find the intent to commit an unspecified misdemeanor. And where the Commonwealth has not identified a misdemeanor, as here, the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant intended to commit a particular misdemeanor; instead, proof of intent to commit an unspecified misdemeanor is sufficient under G. L. c. 266, § 16A. (Citations and quotations omitted.)
But, you may ask, what about due process and the defendant’s constitutional right to know exactly what crimes he or she is being charged with?
According to the SJC,
Of course, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Commonwealth’s failure to specify the intended misdemeanor at trial does not infringe upon a defendant’s due process rights. (Citations and quotations omitted.)
The full text of the slip opinion is attached below.