In 2021 a sewer pipe broke in Chelsea and flooded an apartment complex.
About a year after the flood, the property owner sent a demand letter to the city.
According to court documents, the letter was entitled “M.G.L. ch. 93A Demand Letter for Violation of the Consumer Protection Act.”
The letter accused the city of unfair and deceptive conduct following the flood. For instance, municipal officials “made the process of working with the city on damages the city caused impossible.” Additionally, the letter accused the city of failing to “provide reasonable solutions based on expert report.”
Oddly enough, the letter never alleged that the flooding was caused by the city’s negligence. In fact, the letter contained no mention of the flooding incident.
Ultimately the property owner sued the city for negligence.
The city’s attorney asserted the affirmateive defense of “defective presentment” pursuant to G.L. c. 258, Sec. 4.
That law states, in part, that “A civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer…”
The city argued that the demand letter failed to present a claim.
A superior court judge agreed and dismissed the case.
The decision was appealed and today the Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal.
According to the Appeals Court,
we hold that the c. 93A demand letter failed to satisfy the presentment requirements of c. 258, § 4, for the following reasons. First, the letter contains no reference to the factual basis of liability. Indeed, there is no reference to the sewer pipes, the incident at issue, or the city’s alleged failure to maintain the sewer pipes…Second, the letter contains no reference to the legal basis or theory of liability. The letter does not even contain the word “negligence” and does not assert that the plaintiff’s damages were caused by the city’s negligence…Third, the letter contains no reference to c. 258 or the 9 MTCA…Finally, the letter contains no reference to the date of the incident or date of injury. The combination of these deficiencies compels the conclusion that the demand letter was inadequate to fulfill the statutory purpose of the presentment requirement.
At the risk of beating a dead horse, the slip opinion it goes on to add,
Indeed, we are aware of no case, nor have the parties cited any, where a purported presentment letter failed to reference the cause of action, the factual basis of liability, the legal basis or theory of liability, and the date of the incident, yet was still considered an adequate presentment within the meaning of G. L. c. 258, § 4.
The full text of the slip opinion is attached below.