In the early 1990s, a homeowner signed a written agreement with his girlfriend.
The agreement stated that it was the homeowner’s intention “to share the ownership of [his house] with [his girlfriend] as if her name were affixed to the Title by Deed, as Joint Tenants with the right of survivorship.”
The same garbled document also stated that the girlfriend was “unable at the present time to hold joint ownership of the said real property, the purpose of the Agreement is to provide for her one-half interest in said property.”
According to court documents, the girlfriend would somehow forfeit her son’s disability benefits if she were added to the deed–hence the legal chicanery.
The homeowner eventually died and, unsurprisingly, his heirs and his girlfriend got into a dispute over the property’s ownership.
The girlfriend (plaintiff in the suit) wanted a declaratory judgment adjudicating her sole owner of the property.
The heirs (who were the defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the girlfriend/plaintiff’s claims as frivolous.
In Massachusetts, a lawsuit is frivolous if “(1) it is devoid of any reasonable factual support; or (2) it is devoid of any arguable basis in law; or (3) the action or claim is subject to dismissal based on a valid legal defense such as the statute of frauds.” See G. L. c. 184, Ā§ 15 (c).
A trial-level judge denied the motion to dismissed and the heirs/defendants appealed the decision.
In a slip opinion published today, the Appeals Court affirmed the judge’s decision.
According to the Appeals Court,
As the motion judge found, the statements that “the purpose of the Agreement is to provide for her one-half interest in said property” and “it is the intention of the current owner, Richard Allen to share the ownership of said real property equally with Patricia as if her name were affixed to the Title by Deed” provide an arguable basis in fact and law that the agreement intended to convey a present interest. G. L. c. 184, Ā§ 15 (c). The absence of language of conveyance does not prevent an argument that the agreement did, in fact, convey a present interest. See Kaufman v. Federal Nat’l Bank, 287 Mass. 97, 100101 (1934) (“where a deed of real estate shows by its language that it was intended to pass title by one form of conveyance, by which however title could not pass, courts have made the deed effective by construing it as a deed of some other form”). Although the agreement’s statement that the plaintiff is “unable at the present time to hold joint ownership of said real property” raises a considerable question whether the decedent intended to convey a present interest in the property, “[a] considerable question . . . is not the same thing as a frivolous argument.”4 Fariello, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 570.
To read the full text of the slip opinion, click the document below.