A mother who had guardianship of her adult son with cognitive disabilities asked the court for a restraining order protecting the son against his father.
The court granted the order and the father appealed the decision.
The father argued, in part, that the state’s abuse prevention statute (G.L. c. 209A) does not permit a parent to seek a restraining order on behalf of an adult child.
Under G.L. 209A, § 3, “[a] person suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or household member may file a complaint in the court requesting protection from such abuse, including, but not limited to, the following orders: “(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether the defendant is an adult or minor; “(b) ordering the defendant to refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless authorized by the court, whether the defendant is an adult or minor; . . . “(d) awarding the plaintiff temporary custody of a minor child; . . . [and] “(h) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the plaintiff’s child, or child in plaintiff’s care or custody . . . .”
On appeal, the father argued that § 3 (d) allows the court to grant custody of a minor child, not an adult, even one who is cognitively impaired.
He also contends that the word “child” in § 3 (h) applies only to minors.
Therefore, the lower court should not have issued the restraining order in this case.
The Appeals Court rejected the father’s argument.
According to the Appeals Court panel,
under the plain language of § 3 (h), the judge may “order[] the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the plaintiff’s child, or child in plaintiff’s care or custody.” We reject the argument that the child had to be a minor as this is not consistent with that plain language. See Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 333 (2001) (“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its plain meaning.”). Both parties agree that the son needed a guardian, and both were seeking that appointment. Given that the son was in the mother’s “care or custody,” the judge acted within his authority to enter the c. 209A order to protect the son from abuse by the father.
To read the full text of the slip opinion, click the document below.