On November 10, 2026, a three-judge panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA). The case, Richard Max Strahan v. The Governor & others (26-P-50), was brought by the pro se plaintiff (also known as Man Against Xtinction).
Strahan filed a verified complaint alleging that commercial fishing practices licensed by state officials harm protected species, including the Northern Right Whale, Humpback Whale, and Leatherback Sea Turtle. He asserted claims under the federal Endangered Species Act’s citizen-suit provision, the Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Mandamus Act, and stated that he had provided the required 60-day notice. The Superior Court dismissed the case for failure to comply with Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (e) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). It also denied his request to waive fees and costs, finding his indigency affidavit insufficient (even after a supplemental filing) and the issue moot due to the dismissal. The court additionally warned him about prior disrespectful communications with court staff.
Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Appeals Court (Vuono, Massing & Singh, JJ.) held that the complaint, on its face, states a cognizable citizen suit for protection of the listed animals. While such claims are well established in federal court under the Endangered Species Act (citing Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997)), the panel noted that the viability of a MESA-based claim in state court is less clear. Because it was not “crystal clear” that the plaintiff cannot prevail or that amendment would be futile, the dismissal could not stand. Sua sponte dismissals, the court observed, are “strong medicine” to be used sparingly.
On the fee-waiver issue, the court vacated the denial. Under the Indigent Court Costs Law (G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A–27G) and controlling precedent (Adjartey v. Central Division of the Housing Court Department), a judge may not deny a waiver based on indigency without first holding a hearing. The panel left open the possibility that, on remand, the Superior Court judge may grant the waiver without a hearing or schedule one to assess eligibility.
The judgment of dismissal is reversed, the fee-waiver order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the memorandum and order.
This unpublished Rule 23.0 decision is directed primarily to the parties and carries persuasive rather than binding force. It underscores both the high bar for early dismissal of pro se environmental complaints and the procedural protections surrounding indigency determinations in Massachusetts courts.