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In a summary decision issued November 16, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the denial of a motion for a new trial filed by Eiah Nahnie, a Liberian political asylee. Nahnie sought to withdraw his 2013 guilty plea to assault by means of a dangerous weapon, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of ammunition without an FID card, arguing that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him of the immigration consequences of the plea.

Nahnie was born in Liberia and fled a civil war there around age seven, joining his mother in Worcester under a grant of asylum. He grew up in Worcester. In 2006 his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen; Nahnie attended the ceremony and later claimed he believed he too had become a citizen. Before pleading guilty, he told his plea counsel that he “had U.S. citizenship.” Counsel’s notes reflected that he had lived in Worcester “all his life” and “came at 6.” The motion judge did not credit Nahnie’s assertion that he was unaware he was not a U.S. citizen.

The Superior Court motion judge denied the new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing. The judge found that counsel’s performance was deficient but that Nahnie had not shown prejudice. The Appeals Court (Hershfang, Tan & Allen, JJ.) agreed that no evidentiary hearing was required. The Commonwealth had stipulated to the factual submissions in the affidavits, and defense counsel made no offer of proof of additional evidence that a hearing would have developed.

On the merits, the Appeals Court affirmed on different grounds: it concluded that plea counsel’s performance was not deficient. Under Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, a criminal defense attorney must inquire into a client’s citizenship and, once the attorney learns the client is a noncitizen, make further reasonable inquiry into the client’s specific immigration status. Here, Nahnie affirmatively told counsel he was a U.S. citizen, so the further-inquiry obligation never arose. Contemporary professional standards likewise did not require counsel to independently corroborate or disbelieve a client’s statement that he was a citizen. Because performance was not “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,” the court did not need to reach the prejudice question (including the special weight that asylee status can carry in that analysis).

The decision underscores that a client’s own representation of citizenship can protect plea counsel from an ineffective-assistance claim based on immigration consequences, even when the client is in fact a noncitizen asylee.