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On November 19, 2026, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a summary decision affirming Susan C. Sanon’s conviction for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). The panel (Shin, Hodgens & Wood, JJ.) rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the trial judge’s jury instructions.

The case arose from a November 12, 2022, incident in Ipswich. A resident reported a car parked across from his home with its lights on for roughly three hours. Officer Marc Cecilio found Sanon alone and asleep in the fully reclined driver’s seat. The engine was off, but the keys were in the ignition; the car sat partly on the road and partly on the shoulder. She was difficult to awaken, appeared confused and extremely lethargic, and gave incoherent answers about where she was going. Two empty Bacardi rum “nip” bottles were recovered from the vehicle. She was transported to Beverly Hospital, where records noted that she admitted drinking an unknown amount of Bacardi that evening, that her history was “limited due to intoxication,” and that the examining physician described her as appearing intoxicated. She was discharged the next morning once deemed clinically sober. Cecilio, who had training and experience in OUI investigations, opined that she was “not sober.”

At trial, Sanon testified that she had been exhausted, got lost, and pulled over to rest without drinking. The jury convicted her. On appeal she argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove she operated the vehicle while impaired. The Appeals Court disagreed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it found that her admission to paramedics that she had been driving home, combined with her being alone in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition and no evidence that anyone else had driven the car, supported a finding of operation. On intoxication, the court pointed to her lethargy and confusion, the empty nips, her hospital admission of drinking, the physician’s observations, and the officer’s opinion. It further held that the jury could reasonably infer she had consumed additional alcohol before parking and was impaired at the time she operated the car, rejecting the claim that the Commonwealth’s theory required impermissible “inference upon inference.”

Sanon also argued that the judge erred by failing to give, on the court’s own initiative, a supplemental instruction clarifying that a police officer’s opinion about sobriety is lay testimony based on experience rather than expert opinion grounded in scientific or specialized knowledge. Because the instruction was neither requested nor objected to, review was for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court found no error. The judge had already told the jury that the opinion was lay (not expert) testimony they could accept or reject, that a police officer’s testimony was entitled to no greater weight than that of any other witness, and that they alone must decide whether the defendant was under the influence. Cecilio’s mention of his training and experience did not convert his lay opinion into expert testimony. For the same reasons, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the supplemental language.

As a Rule 23.0 summary decision, the memorandum is directed primarily to the parties, is not circulated to the full court, and may be cited only for its persuasive value—not as binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed.