In 2022 a jury at Worcester District Court convicted Dejan Belnavis of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.
At trial the prosecutor presented a Walmart surveillance video which showed a man drawing a gun and pushing it into the chest of a customer.
In addition to the video, two officers from the Worcester Police Department testified.
According to court documents,
Each officer testified concerning his encounters with the defendant. Specifically, the first officer had encountered the defendant four times over a five-year period and had viewed his identification at least once, and the second officer had encountered the defendant two times over a four-year period and had been present when someone else asked for his identification.
Both officers then viewed the surveillance video and, in front of the jury, identified Dejan as the man wielding the gun.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor relied heavily on the officers’ identification testimony. He once again played the video for jurors and said
it’s this individual who [the first officer] and [the second officer] identified as Dejan Belnavis, somebody that they’re familiar with, somebody that they know, somebody that even [the first officer] has had an opportunity to ask him for his license or identification and has been able to positively identify him, Dejan Belnavis, through identification as Dejan Belnavis.
Ultimately the jury convicted Dejan and the judge sentenced him to 6 months in jail.
His attorney appealed the verdict, arguing that the officers’ identification of the defendant was unfairly prejudicial.
The Appeals Court agreed and reversed the conviction.
The applicable case law states that
[a] lay witness is permitted to identify an individual depicted in a video recording or photograph if that testimony would assist the jurors in making their own independent identification. [S]uch testimony is admissible . . . when the witness possesses sufficient[ly] relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also possess. (Citations and quotations omitted.)
This requirement was not met in the present case according to the justices.
Here, despite being alerted to the need to do so, the Commonwealth failed to establish that the officers had sufficient relevant familiarity with the defendant to admit their lay identification testimony. The officers’ encounters were infrequent and sporadic. The first officer had encountered the defendant only four times over a five-year period. The second officer had encountered the defendant only two times in the four years before the trial and not in the previous two or three years. (Citations and quotations omitted.)
The full text of the opinion is attached below.